Abstract
Introduction
The paper considers message-passing asynchronous systems in which processes fail by crashing. These systems are necessarily concerned with network partitions, and as systems grow to larger and larger numbers of nodes, handling partitions becomes more pressing. Despite this, researchers commonly assume networks will not partition because this greatly simplifies protocol development. Since protocols based on the "absence of partitions" assumption are correct only to the extent that the assumption is valid, it is vital to know whether the assumption is justified, and what the consequences are when it is not.
Unfortunately "absence of partitions" is a very imprecise specification. It is usually understood to be either (1) the absence of link failures, or ( 2 ) that any two operational processes p and q can always communicate. In asynchronous systems communication delays are unbounded, and local clock rates may drift arbitrarily making it impossible to determine whether a process's lack of response is caused by a link problem (failed or heavily loaded) or the process itself (crashed or very slow). In this way, slow processes and links can lead to virtual partitions, which are indistinguishable from real partitions. A protocol assuming the "absence of partitions" must exclude these virtual partitions as well as physical ones. This paper gives a precise definition of partition, accounting for the nature of asynchronous systems by covering virtual partitions as well as physical ones.
We are concerned with distributed fault-tolerant applications. Fault-tolerance can be understood in two ways, meaning either (1) that failures will not cause the application to take unsafe actions, or (2) that the application is able to make safe progress even if (some) processes crash. The first interpretation considers fault tolerance as a safety issue only; the second adds a liveness requirement to the safety issue. We consider the latter. To illustrate the liveness issue, consider mutual exclusion implemented using a token. If the token holder process crashes, liveness requires that the token be regenerated.
In these contexts, satisfying the liveness requirement raises the issue of detecting process failures, and leads us to introduce a mechanism for suspecting failures. This mechanism, associated to each process p , is called the failure suspector FS(p). The liveness requirement just described translates to a liveness requirement for our failure suspector: FS(p) is required to eventually detect each real crash. Unfortunately the price of liveness is accuracy: in requiring bounded-time detection of true crashes we necessarily risk erroneously suspecting non-crashed processes. While a discussion of handling inaccurate failure suspicions is beyond the scope of the paper, understanding one key issue will help in understanding the process behavior considered in Section 2. There are two ways to handle the possibility of inaccurate failure suspicions. Consider two processes p and q, and assume that p has been notified by FS@) that q has crashed. One alternative for p is to eventually adopt the failure belief as being correct. This allows p to take any actions required by q's failure (for example to regenerate the token if q was the token holder). In this model, failure beliefs become stable. The other choice is for p to be permitted to "change its mind" regarding q's failure. In this second model failure beliefs are not stable, hence it is inappropriate to take actions that would be unsafe if the failure is not real. For example, in this model, p could not safely regenerate a token held by q after suspecting q's failure, because the suspicion could later prove to be incorrect.
The "stable failure" model has, for example, been adopted by the Isis system [l], whereas the "non-stable failure" model is considered in [3, 21. The "stable failure" model is often necessary in building live, faulttolerant applications. We saw this above in the case of token regeneration, but the same issues arise in many problems, such as primary-backup computing, and replicated data management. To achieve both liveness and safety, we must overcome the inaccuracy of failure beliefs with some form of group-wise consistency: if p incorrectly suspects q to have failed, and yet wants to take a safe action related to q's failure, p must be ensure that its belief in q's faultiness will be shared by other processes with which it subsequently interacts. In particular, if p observes the failure of q and then communicates with r , a consistency goal might be that T will also observe the failure of q before it delivers this message.
To summarize, the stable-failure belief model achieves liveness (in a probabilistic sense); safety is ensured by requiring some form of consistency among failure beliefs.
Further implications of failure belief stability on processes behavior is discussed in Section 2, which presents the system model and introduces our failure suspector. Section 3 defines partitions and proves that a single incorrect failure suspicion leads, inevitably, to a partition. This result makes the "no partition" assumption questionable. Section 4 discusses how weakening the system model while strengthening the failure suspector can prevent partitions. Unfortunately, the the stronger failure suspectors are not implementable, in even the barest model of asynchrony. Section 5 concludes the paper by relating this back to the nopartition assumption.
System model and Failure Suspector
The system model consists of a name space of process identifiers, Proc = {pl,pz,. . .}. The name space is infinite to model infinite executions in which processes continually fail and recover, though at any point in time there are only a finite number of executing processes. For the processes in this set, we assume a completely-connected network of channels. Processes communicate only by passing messages over these channels. The system has no global clock and message transmission delays are unbounded. Processes fail by crashing, which we model by the distinct event crash; we model the recovery of a process by assigning it a new identifier. Any process p may send a message m to any process q, send,(q, m), deliver a message m' sent by some process r , dlvrp(r,m'), and perform local computation. A process history is a linear sequence of events with a unique start event, in which e; denotes the xth event p executes. A system run is a tuple of infinite process histories,l one for each process that executes. A cut is a finite prefix of a run.
As in [5]
, event e, of process q directly precedes event ep of process p in run p (written e , -+p e p ) if either (1) e, = send,(p,m) and ep = dlvrp(q,m) in p, or (2) p = q, e, = e:, and ep = e;+1 in p's execution history in p. Event e, precedes event e p in p (written e, -'p e p ) if they are the beginning and end of a chain of Ap-related events. Hereafter, we do not note the run explicitly, unless necessary. The logical formula l-BEFORE(ep, e , ) holds if and only if ep-+e,, whereas the formula BEFORE(ep,e,) holds if e p -+ e,. When e p is an event in cut c and BEFORE(eq,ep) holds on c, then c is causally consistent if and only if e, is also an event in c. 'We make histories of crashed processes infinite by appending infinitely many crash events.
The Failure Suspector
Crash failures are surprisingly difficult to handle in asynchronous systems. Fischer et al. [4] show that, because it is impossible to distinguish a crashed process from one that is just very slow, any problem requiring "all correct processes" to take some action cannot be solved deterministically. One way around this is for asynchronous systems to incorporate a mechanism for suspecting failures and a policy for handling failure suspicions To ensure fault-tolerant applications are live, we need only require that failure suspectors eventually suspect true crashes. In asynchronous systems this takes the following form: if there is some point in p's execution after which q does not directly affect p , then FS(p) will suspect q faulty, or p will eventually crash. Note that FS(p) is easily implemented, for example with local time-outs. Note also, that since FS(p) operates along with p it can only guess whether q will ever directly affect p ; it may use sophisticated techniques, but it can only approximate with probability whether q is crashed. As a result FS(p) will make erroneous suspicions.
FS(p)
Liveness. For all executiois and all processes q, unless there are an infinite number of event-pairs satisfying eq-+ep, eventually FS(p) suspects process q. Formally, define the set of directly-related event pairs between q and p as :
Causes,(q, P ) = { (eq, e, ) I e, % e.} If this set is finite, eventually p suspects q or p crashes:
I Causes,(q,p) I < 00 * OFAULTYp(Q) v OCRASHED.
I END I
We are not concerned with how FS(p) is implemented, only that it be live.
Other System Model Properties
Processes in our system model are also subject to certain constraints. As discussed in Section 1 these arise from the liveness requirements of the applications and the impossibility of accurately detecting a processcrash. The liveness requirement led us to adopt the "stable failure" model. Stability of failure beliefs is our first process property. This has an immediate consequence for channel behavior: once p believes q faulty, it neither accepts further messages from q, nor sends further messages to q. Is this reasonable? Recall the liveness requirement put on the applications we consider. Assume that FAuLTY,(q) holds. This might leadp to take some actions A in order to recover from q's suspected failure. Consider now a message m from q , received by p once FAULTYp(q) holds. Accepting m might lead p to execute an action A' inconsistent with action A. To avoid this type of inconsistency (without forcing p to crash or inspect messages' contents before delivering them) p rejects any further messages from q once FAuLTy,(q) holds. That p acts symmetrically in not sending to q further messages upon believing q faulty is reasonable. This lead to the second process property.
Channel Disconnect:
Toward achieving failure belief consistency, we introduce a third process property. We motivated the need for failure belief consistency as a consequence of the inaccuracy of any live failure detection mechanism. Differing failure beliefs could easily result in unsafe (i.e. inconsistent) actions. Safety can be regained if some form of consistency among failure beliefs is achieved. This is precisely the role of the gossip property.
Gossip. Failure beliefs propagate along causal chains of events. For processes p, q, and r: BEFORE(faUltyp(Q), ep) h l-BEFORE(ep, e,) * BEFORE(faU&,(q), e,) v l-BEFORE(e,, faulty,(q)) In summary the liveness and safety requirements put on the fault-tolerant distributed applications we have in mind, led to three system process requirements: stability of failure beliefs, channel disconnect, and gossip of failure beliefs.
From Incorrect Failure Notifications to Partitions
We now show that given the system model and failure suspector just described, partitions are unavoidable. We introduce the ISOLATED() property, define partitions, and then prove the result.
Definition [ISOLATED(S)] Given s a subset of
Proc(c), ISOLATED(S) holds on c if and only if every process considered alive by some p E S, is also in S:
ISOLATED(S) !
Ef A A (ALIYEp(q) 3 q E S ) .
PES qEProc(c)
I END I If ISOLATED(S) holds, the processes in S believe themselves to be the only live processes in the system. With this definition, it is natural to declare a system partitioned exactly when there are at least two disjoint subsets that each believe themselves to be the only live processes in the system. 
PROOF Let e,, be the event faultyp(q). Let e, # mask, not be causally dependent on ep (that is, TBEFORE(ep,er)). Then either (1) there is some future event e: such that ep + e: or, (2) there will never be a causal relation between ep and any future event on r.
Clause (1) but neither q n o r p ever crashes, then eventually there are a t least two disjoint subsets, S a n d T, such that p E S, q E T, ISOLATED(S) and ISOLATED(T).
PROOF Renameo and let c be the consistent cut along which FAULTYp(qO) initially holds, and define A-Setp(c) to be all processes p believes alive at c.
Once FAuLTYp(qo) holds, Gossip means that eventually every r E A-Setp(c) either adopts FAULTY,(Qo), crashes, or believes FAULTY&). Without loss of generality, assume only p gossips faulty(qo), and let c1 be the consistent cut at which faulty(q0) is gossiped (as far as possible) to the members of A-Set,(c). Let SI (along c1) be the subset of A-Set,(c) that adopted FAuLTY(qo), with the others having either crashed or adopted FAULTY (p): TFAULTY,(p) A-CRASHED,) . If SI is not isolated then there is some T E SI, such that ALIVET(Q1) holds at c1, but q1 $ ! SI. Since fuuZty (q0) is fully gossiped, the only reasons this q1 would not have adopted FAULTY*, (qo) are (1) it already believed FAULTY,,@), or (2) q1 had crashed. In either case FAuLTYp(ql) eventually holds -in the first case by reciprocity, and in the second by FS(p) liveness. Now, p must gossip fuulty(ql), so let c2 and Sa be c1 and SI after having gossiped q1's faultiness. We can continue in this way: any process qi that did not adopt p's belief in the faultiness of process qi-1 must either be crashed or believe p faulty. Eventually, some s k is isolated; in the worst case s k is the singleton { p } .
Analogously, reciprocity means that FAULTY,, ( p ) eventually holds, and we can construct T, as we did for S, from A-Set,,().
To see that the two isolated sets are disjoint note that T E s * FAULTY,(Qo). Reciprocity means that FAULTY~,, ( T ) eventually holds, and construction
Since we can never guarantee the failure suspectors will not make mistakes, the "no partition" assumption is invalid in the system model considered.
Understanding the No Partition Assumption
Given Proposition 3.3 it is important to know how an incorrect failure suspicion partitions the system, and whether we can alter our model to prevent partitions given the inevitability of incorrect suspicions.
From the definition of ISOLATED(), partitions occur when failures are reciprocated. So assuming FAuLTYp(q) holds erroneously, how can q be prevented from believing FAULTY,(p)? Since we cannot sacrifice FS(q) liveness, we are left with three choices:
1. Force q to crash before it believes and is able t o propagate FAULTY ( p ) . Lacking an omniscient observer, only p can attempt to cause q to crash because only p knows it executed fuulty,(q). Unfortunately, the absence of synchronization mechanisms means p can never ensure that any command telling q to crash itself will arrive at q before q reciprocates with (and propagates)
2. Force failure suspectors to attain a quorumstyle agreement on suspicions before actually emitting the fuuZty() suspicion. This is done in [6, 71 where the quorum is a simple majority. Processes in a majority subset can take further actions, while those in the minority cannot.
Whether a majority can be obtained determines whether the system can progress. This is further discussed in Section 4.1.
3.
Concede failure belief stability at the expense of guaranteeing system progress. We explore this option in Section 4.2.
faultY,(P).4
The Primary Partition Model
The "primary partition'' model is one in which the system is allowed to partition, but one assumes that there is always an identified primary partition that is unique, in being the only partition so designated, and in which decisions can be made on behalf of the system as a whole, without risk that contradictory decisions will be made in other partitions. The primary partition model is often considered weaker than the "no partition" model: the former allows progress in the primary partition, while the latter would not allow progress if any partition were ever to form.
Specifically, neither the no-partitions model nor the primary-partition model can guarantee progress (of the type of distributed problems we are concerned with) in situations where consensus cannot be solved. Since the primary-partition model ensures liveness in situations where the no-partitions model would not, we recommend that the primary partition model be assumed in most algorithms that make assumptions about partitioning.
Conceding Failure Belief Stability
In conceding failure belief stability we no longer need the Channel Disconnect and Gossip properties. Chan4This strategy will not preclude permanent partitions that arise from temporary link failures.
ne1 Disconnect was introduced as a consistent consequence of failure belief stability. Gossiping is used to bring about consistency of failure beliefs, but lacking stability a process may change its belief immediately after being gossiped another's failure: consistency of failure beliefs is no longer an issue.
In this section, we assume neither stability, disconnect, nor gossip and derive additional requirements on the system's failure suspectors that would preclude partitions. In particular, partitions cannot exist if for all cuts, c, some process is believed alive by every process in Proc(c). 
PES ,ET
Thus, Proc() is partitioned at c if and only if every process in the system is believed faulty by every member of some isolated set. F]
In summary, preventing partitions requires that some process in the system is not believed faulty by some member of every isolated set. PROOF Let S andT be isolated and considerp E SnT,
and r E A-Setp(c). Because S is isolated and p E S, r must also be in S. Similarly, ISOLATED(T) and p E T
give r E T. m l Now consider three isolated sets S, T, and U such that S n T # 8, and T n U # 8. Unless these intersections We say Proc(c) is degraded if Proc(c) is carved into isolated subsets but is not partitioned. It is fullydegraded if I Proc(c) 1 = n, there are n isolated subsets such that n -1 isolated subsets are process pairs, and one isolated subset is a singleton. This represents the worst-case, non-partitioned separation (or, equivalently, belief consistency) between all process pairs.
Interpreting Partitions and Distributed Consensus
The star formation is exactly analogous to Chandra et.al.'s work on Weak Failure Suspectors [3, 21. This work proves that if some functional process is not suspected (for a sufficiently long period of time) by every other functional process, Distributed Consensus can be solved. This corresponds, in our terminology, to the absence of a partition. Essentially, the failure suspector OW requires eventual absence of partitions for a critical period of time (i.e. long enough to run their protocol). Note that the results of [3, 21 also hold in the primary partition of a primary partition model.
Conclusion References
The paper has given a precise definition of partition, accounting for the nature of asynchronous systems by covering virtual partitions as well as physical ones.
The paper has further considered two classes of faulttolerant distributed applications, characterized by the stability vs. non-stability of failure beliefs. The stablefailure system model has been completed by process properties that follow logically from the stability requirement. They lead to the following result: a single incorrect failure suspicion already leads to partition the system. The only safe way to avoid partitions is to require the failure suspectors t o attain a quorum agreement on suspicions before actually emitting the fauIty() suspicion. As any so called membership service assumes the stable-failure system model, any membership service has to include such a quorum condition.
The paper has also shown that absence of partition is obtained by requiring that every failure suspector 'agree' on a subset of non-faulty processes. This is a valid "no partition" assumption in the "non-stable failure" system model. Finally, the paper suggests that the "no-partition" assumption be related to a "primary-partition'' assumption when possible. Although a system that takes this approach will still be unable to make progress in runs for which consensus could not also be solved, such an assumption is less restrictive, more practical, and hence preferable to a no-partitions one. 
